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Abstract 
Planning to mitigate the impacts of a disaster can be an important activity for both private 
companies and public agencies.  In this paper we consider a supply system that provides 
needed goods or services to a region that may be the subject of some type of disaster, 
such as an attack by a terrorist or the result of a natural event or accident. The supply 
system is represented by a set of existing capacitated facilities. We assume that the loss of 
one or more facilities to a disaster will tighten available supply and increase the distances 
over which the service or good must be delivered, thereby increasing operation costs and 
reducing service. Such a disaster may even reduce the capacity of the supply/storage to 
the extent that the goods must be rationed as remaining supply may be outstripped by 
demand. We consider the case where resources may be available to mitigate some of the 
impacts of a possible disaster by the advanced protection of one or more facilities. We 
show how this problem can be formulated as a “tri-level” optimization model and propose 
a solution approach based on a tree search strategy. We demonstrate the policy 
implications of this model using a hypothetical planning problem. Through this example, 
we show how the results of our model can be used to inform planners and policy makers 
in disaster mitigation planning.    
Keywords: facility protection, disaster mitigation, bilevel programming, 
capacitated flow and transport  
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Advanced planning is an important activity within the context of disaster management. 
The major objective of such planning should be to identify the possible impacts of a given 
type of disaster and then to determine the best plan of action for mitigating the effects of 
such an event. For example, when Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast of Louisiana and 
Alabama, disaster was not completely avoided, but it was mitigated by advanced 
planning. Even though the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers had requested funding over a 
number of years to upgrade the levee and pump system of New Orleans, the U.S. 
Congress had not allocated funds for the project and New Orleans was left with a 
protection system that failed. To look at the immense damage caused by the storm as well 
as the number of stranded people overlooks the fact that the majority of the people safely 
departed the city based upon an advanced plan involving reversing the direction of city 
bound lanes of a major interstate highway. This “contraflow” evacuation plan helped 
evacuate the majority of the inhabitants in a timely and efficient way (Wolshon 2006).  
Without that plan, this disaster would have been much worse. 
 
It is important to recognize that advanced disaster planning is an important task for 
government agencies as well as private companies, although the objectives may be quite 
different. Whereas public agencies are principally concerned with saving lives and 
preventing damages like flooding, private companies are concerned with protecting their 
facilities and keeping goods and services flowing. Large retailers, as an example, often 
plan for hurricane season in the southeast U.S. by stockpiling goods like water and 
plywood (Albright 2009). Without this advanced planning, it is quite possible that local 
demand would cause shortages of critical supplies. The important issue is that, although 
the objectives may be quite different, advanced planning may be strategically important 
across the spectrum of government agencies and private corporations in order to deal with 
a potential disaster. 
 
Over the last few years there has been an increased interest in modeling the fragility of 
supply and service systems due to some disruptive event (see for example Brown et al. 
2006; Snyder et al. 2006; Murray et al. 2008; Church and Scaparra 2006). This focus has 
been split between network fragility (Wood 1993; Wollmer 1964; O’Kelly and Kim 
2007; Murray et al. 2003; Zhuang and Bier 2007; Peterson and Church 2008) and facility 
system fragility (Church et al. 2004; Rawls and Turnquist 2006) over a wide range of 
events from natural disasters to intentional strikes. Although the literature of system 
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disruption is historically rooted in the military problem of interdiction (Wollmer, 1964; 
Israeli and Wood 2002), recent disasters such as 9-11 have forced planners and policy 
makers to ask what might happen (Haimes and Longstaff 2002; Haimes 2006; Grubesic et 
al. 2003) as well as how to plan within the uncertainty of what might befall a system 
(Altay and Green 2006; Church and Scaparra 2006; Rawls and Turnquist 2006; Ukkusuri 
and Yushimito 2008; Alcada-Almeida et al. 2009 ). A few recent papers have focused on 
how to optimize system protection within a limited budget (Azaiez and Bier 2007, Brown 
et al. 2006, Church and Scaparra 2006).  Notably lacking in past model development is 
the optimal protection of a system of capacitated facilities. Since most facilities operate 
within defined levels of operation or capacity, most of the past work cannot be directly 
applied in real world settings. Our objective of this paper is to propose a model construct 
which optimizes a limited amount of protection resources among a set of capacitated 
facilities in order to mitigate a worst case disaster event. We show how this model can be 
used to help inform planners and policy makers in disaster planning. 
 
In the next section, we present a short review of past work that is related to the problem 
that we address in this paper. We then formulate a planning model for a capacitated 
logistics system comprised of a set of demands and facilities, where one or more facilities 
may be rendered inoperable due to a disaster. We assume that resources are available to 
fortify or protect some of the facilities and the problem is to allocate the protection 
resources so that the system is as resilient as possible in the event of a disastrous 
intentional strike or natural event. Protection resources and strategies can vary 
considerably depending on the type of system and possible disruption. For example, 
protecting against an earthquake may involve seismic upgrading, building a new 
approach bridge to an industrial site, or providing a backup power generator system so 
that the facility can operate during the loss of electrical power. Protecting against 
flooding may involve relocating a facility to higher ground, providing pumps and 
generators to keep a facility dry, or even developing a storm wall. Protecting against an 
interdictor may involve added security/guards, perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, 
hardened internet and communication systems, etc. Whatever the type of disaster, we 
assume that there is some set of possible actions which can be taken to enhance protection 
and keep a facility in operation. Although the proposed model is designed to represent a 
generic system, we expect that the proposed construct here will be modified for specific 
applications. The important element is that the model is extensible and is representative 
of the general planning problem for protection in light of a potential disaster.  After 
giving a model formulation and discussing how it can be solved, we present an 
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application to a hypothetical data set to underscore the insights that may be generated by 
using the model in practice to support disaster planning. Finally, we conclude with a short 
discussion on possible refinements.    
2. Background 
Optimization has been used in the design and operation of many logistics systems, 
ranging from public systems (e.g. optimal fire station location) to private sector systems 
(e.g. warehouse location and capacity allocation). Although the common emphasis is 
directed towards modeling for an optimal design or an efficient operation, some efforts 
have been directed at determining weakness in system design and operation. An example 
of this is the identification of the critical links of a network, associated with a network’s 
ability to handle traffic flow.  Historically, modelers have approached the issue of 
detecting system weakness with the perspective of an “interdictor” who plans to strike a 
system. Assume that the “interdictor” has enough resources to strike and render useless K 
arcs of a network (Wollmer 1964). The question is: “what K arcs when removed have the 
greatest impact on the remaining system?”  Suppose the underlying operation is to ship 
items along the shortest path between an origin and a destination. The objective of the 
interdictor would be to take out the arcs which would maximize the length of the shortest 
route from the origin to the destination (Israeli and Wood 2002). Since the shortest route 
may well change when an arc is removed, the problem is somewhat complicated to solve 
(Israeli and Woods 2002).  The solution to this type of interdiction model gives the 
analyst and planner an understanding as to which links are critical as well as to what 
extent system operation can be compromised by losing a specific number of network 
links. Thus, the solution represents a worst case, as the model seeks to find the most 
disruptive solution associated with an event level of some specified magnitude, whether 
natural or intended. In the next few paragraphs we briefly characterize past research on 
interdiction associated with networks and facilities.  The interested reader should consult 
Snyder et al. (2006) for a review on system reliability and disruption and Brachman and 
Church (2009) and Altay and Green (2006) for a review of modeling for disaster 
management.  
 
Network interdiction models were first developed in the 1960’s (see Church et al. 2004 
for a review).  Wollmer (1964) proposed a network interdiction model to optimally 
reduce the maximum flow possible through a graph. This particular problem has 
remained a key research problem (Lim and Smith 2007). Besides modeling the 
interruption of flow and paths, there has also been an interest in modeling overall 
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connectivity and possible cases of failure. A good example of this type of analysis is that 
of Grubesic et al. (2003) where the problem was to analyze topologically the loss of 
internet services and communication connectivity when certain internet backbone links 
are compromised. It should also be mentioned that interdiction may be based upon a cost. 
For example, some arcs may be easier to knock out than others. When interdiction costs 
vary, then interdiction is assumed to be resource limited and is subject to a budget 
constraint.    
 
Interdiction models have also been developed to involve a system of facilities. The first 
facility interdiction model involved the well known p-median location problem. The p-
median model involves the location of a set of p facilities (uncapacitated), in order to 
minimize the weighted distance of serving a set of weighted demand points. It is assumed 
that each demand will be served by their closest facility. The related facility interdiction 
model involves finding which r facilities, when removed, increases the weighted distance 
of service the most (Church et al. 2004).  Although most of the past research has been 
posed where the act of interdiction is always successful when an element is selected (e.g. 
facility or network link), it has also been modeled probabilistically. Suppose that when a 
facility is struck by an interdictor, the interdictor fails a certain percentage of the time. 
We can then define the probabilistic facility interdiction problem as: what is the worst-
case possible loss of a facility system when r facility strikes are allowed, where the 
probability of any successful interdiction is set at some value less than or equal to 1?   
Using this context, Church and Scaparra (2007) were able to show how to generate an 
operational “reliability envelop” for a system of facilities subject to natural or intended 
harm. Note that, if the probability of success is somewhat low, an interdictor may strike 
one facility many times in order to increase the overall probability of successfully 
eliminating a key facility (Losada et al. 2009).  In a related work Rawls and Turnquist 
(2006) have developed an emergency supply system location model based upon a set of 
predefined scenarios. Each scenario is based upon a set of failures, where specific nodes 
and links are not available for that scenario. For their model they defined each scenario 
on a specific hurricane storm track and assumed that specific locations or routes in that 
scenario would be knocked out by the storm.   The overall objective was to locate a set of 
facilities, such that the expected cost of resupply over all scenarios is minimized.   
 
Research on supply systems deployment has also included the possibility of system 
protection. Interdiction can be thought of as an act by nature or man. In either case it may 
be successful without taking some type of protective action. The first model to 
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incorporate protection as an action in a facility operations model involved the median 
problem, where it was assumed that a limited number of facilities, q, could be hardened 
or protected from a disaster or interdictor (Church and Scaparra 2007). The objective was 
to optimally allocate the protective resources in order to reduce the losses that could 
happen by interdiction. This model was called the r-interdiction median problem with 
fortification. Network link protection has been considered in two types of problems: the 
shortest path interdiction protection (Cappanera and Scaparra 2008) and the design of a 
seismically protected road network to ensure the safe distribution of supplies after an 
earthquake (Viswanath and Peeta 2003). A review of many of the models that have been 
defined specifically for emergency management can be found in Brachman and Church 
(2009). 
 
It is important to mention that many of the models that have been developed to solve for 
the most destructive case or to identify how to best protect a system with limited 
resources are posed within the context of bi-level optimization. Such models are often 
described as a two person game (Stackelberg 1952), where the top level is the leader and 
the bottom level is the follower (Dempe 2002; Colson et al. 2007). For example, the top 
level in a model that optimizes protective resources, involves selecting which links or 
facilities to be fortified. The bottom level involves the “interdictor” which will attempt to 
do the most harm given that some elements are fortified and others are not. What makes 
this problem hard to solve is that the bottom level solution is a function of the top level 
resource allocation and the top level resource allocation is a function of the bottom level 
disruption. Bi-level problems by their very nature can be very difficult to solve as each 
level contains an objective that is the exact opposite of the next. This is especially true if 
integer decision variables appear in both levels (Moore and Bard 1990). In fact, in only a 
few cases has it been possible to cast a mix-integer bi-level problem as a single level 
problem.  Examples of casting a bi-level problem as a single level problem can be found 
in Church and Scaparra (2006) and Scaparra and Church (2008a). The fact that the 
combined problems of protection and destruction are hard to model in a combined fashion 
has served as a major impediment or barrier to progress in this research. Recent work 
(Brown et al. 2006) has helped to provide insights as to how these complicated models 
might be solved.  
 
Although the above review has only listed a small number of the many contributions in 
the systems literature involving disasters and protection, it does characterize the extent to 
which specific actions, both disruptive and protective, have been optimized within the 
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context of service and supply systems. It should be mentioned here that past work has 
concentrated principally on capacitated network flow and shortest path interdiction or 
uncapacitated facility interdiction and protection. Unfortunately, most systems operate 
with capacity limits, and when a facility has been struck by disaster, alternate facilities 
may not have enough combined capacity to handle the supply needs of those originally 
served by the damaged facility. That is, most of the past facility optimization work does 
not apply to the type of problem that one might find in disaster supply management. Our 
objective, here, is to propose a model construct which will help to fill that gap. In the next 
section we propose a model which optimizes a limited amount of protective resources 
among a set of capacitated facilities serving a set of demand points in order to mitigate a 
worst case disaster event involving the loss of one or more facilities. Conceptually, this 
model contains three levels: the top level- allocates protective resources; the intermediate 
level - interdicts one or more facilities; and the bottom level- operates as efficiently as 
possible the remaining facilities and serves demand as best as possible.  Essentially, there 
are three types of decisions being made by two different actors: 1) the system operator 
decides what to protect and operates what is left as efficiently as possible, and 2) the 
interdictor decides what facilities to disrupt as a worst case event. Although we use the 
term “interdictor” to represent the role of disruption, it represents in general some event 
doing harm, e.g. a terrorist or a natural disaster, which disrupts the system maximally 
within limits (even hurricanes and major natural disasters do not destroy everything). We 
will use the term “fortification” to represent the type of protective action that is taken to 
fend off a destructive strike, whether natural or man-made. Thus, the model that we 
propose is somewhat general in its scope, and we expect that it will be tailored for 
specific applications. Finally, we will show how results from this general model can be 
used to help inform planners and policy makers in disaster planning based upon a 
hypothetical case study. 
3. Protecting facilities in order to deal with a disaster: Model 
development 
In this section, we present the mathematical formulation of the three-level Capacitated r-
Interdiction Median problem with Fortification, referred to in the following as CRIMF. 
The formulation uses the following set of parameters and decision variables. 
Parameters 
 N  set of n demand nodes (indexed by i)  
 F  set of p existing facilities (indexed by j) 
 ai demand at node i  
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 cj capacity at facility j  
 dij  cost for serving customer i from facility j  
 i penalty for not serving customer i  (per unit of demand)   
 r  number of possible losses 
 q  number of facilities that can be hardened 
 
Decision Variables 
 zj 1 if facility j is protected; 0 otherwise 
sj 1 if facility j is interdicted; 0 otherwise 
 xij  fraction of demand i served by facility j after interdiction 
 ui  fraction of demand i which is not served after interdiction 
 
The variables zj and sj represent the upper level protection variables and the middle level 
interdiction variables, respectively. The variables xij and ui are used in the lower 
operational level to evaluate the system efficiency after protection and interdiction. 
 
The trilevel formulation of CRIMF is as follows: 
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The CRIMF model identifies the optimal allocation of q protection resources (2) which 
minimizes the cost function, K (1). This function represents the maximum damage, in 
terms of service and lost sale costs, that can be inflicted to the system after the loss of r 
facilities. The correct value of K is computed in the middle level problem, where the 
interdictor allocates r offensive resources (5) among the unprotected facilities (6) so as to 
maximize the system’s cost (4). In turn, the computation of the system costs after 
interdiction, H, requires solving the lower level operational problem. At the operational 
level, the objective is to minimize the total cost (8), which includes the cost for serving 
the customers and the lost sale cost incurred when some customer demands cannot be met 
due to the insufficient capacity of the system after interdiction. Constraints (9) state that 
all customer demand needs to be accounted for, either as demand allocated to some 
operational facility or as unmet demand. The facility capacity restrictions are modeled in 
constraints (10), which also prevent the allocation of customers to interdicted facilities. 
The integrality of the protection and interdiction variables is enforced by constraints (3) 
and (7) respectively, whereas constraints (11) and (12) state the non-negativity of the 
operational variables. Note that the cardinality constraints on the offensive and defensive 
resources, (2) and (5) respectively, can be replaced by budget constraints if the system 
facilities have different protection and interdiction costs. The solution methodology 
described in the next sections can be easily adjusted to handle this case.  
4.  Integer bilinear reformulation of the interdictor-user problem 
In this section, we show how the two bottom level problems (interdictor and user) can be 
collapsed into a single level problem. This level reduction is based upon the observation 
that, given any solution s to the interdiction problem, the lower level operational problem 
is a transportation problem in the continuous variables x and u only.  It is therefore 
possible to take the dual of this problem to obtain a single level interdiction problem 
which inherently incorporates the optimal system operations. Duality techniques have 
been extensively used to solve bilevel programs with linear inner problems (see for 
example Wood 1993, Israeli and Wood 2002, and more recently Lim and Smith 2007, 
Bayrak and Bailey 2008 and Losada et al. 2009). In our case, duality is used to reduce the 
initial tri-level defender-interdictor-user model to a bilevel program. 
 
Let i and j be the dual variables associated with the demand constraints (9) and the 
capacity constraints (10) respectively. Then, the interdiction-user problem can be 








i scaZK  )1(max     

 (13) 
FjNidijji  ,    ,  (14) 






Fjzs jj      ,1  (17) 
Fjs j      },1,0{  (18) 
Nii      ,0  (19) 
Fjj      ,0  (20) 
To resolve the non-linearity in the objective function introduced by the dualization, we 
use a simple linearization technique which consists of replacing each bilinear term 
jjs )1(   with a new variable jv  (with 0jv ) and adding the following 
linearization constraints to the model: 
 
Msv jj )1(   (21) 
Msv jjj   (22) 
 
The use of constraints (21) and (22) ensures that the new model using the replacement 
variables v  is equivalent to the bilinear model (13)-(20). In fact, if  1js  in the bilinear 
model (and hence the bilinear term is zero), from constraints (21) and (22) we have that
0 jvM . As the variables jv  are non-negative, it must be that 0jv . 
Conversely, if 0js  and the bilinear term is equal to j , from constraints (21)  and 
(22) we have that Mv jj  . As the replacement variable jv  appears in the 
objective of a maximization problem with a negative coefficient, at optimality it will take 
the smallest possible value, i.e. j . A possible value for the constant M to tighten the 
formulation is ). 
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This formulation is a linear MIP and can hence be solved by standard, off-the-shelf 
optimization software. 
5. Solving the bilevel CRIMF to optimality 
As previously mentioned, by collapsing the interdictor-user problem into a single level 
program, CRIMF becomes a bi-level problem. We can therefore solve it by using the 
implicit enumeration algorithm originally proposed to solve the uncapacitated version of 
the r-interdiction median problem with fortification (Scaparra and Church 2008b). 
Different variants of this implicit enumeration method have been successfully applied for 
solving other protection problems, which could not be easily solved by standard 
decomposition methods commonly used for bilevel programs. Examples of successful 
applications can be found both within the context of uncapacitated facility protection 
(Liberatore et al. 2009) and network protection (Cappanera and Scaparra 2009). 
 
The core of the approach is based upon the observation that an optimal protection strategy 
must include at least one of the facilities which are interdicted in the optimal solution to 
the interdiction problem without fortification (Church and Scaparra 2006). This 
observation can be used recursively within an implicit enumeration scheme to reduce the 
number of protection strategies to be evaluated.  
 
The implicit enumeration algorithm is implemented as a search on a binary tree. At the 
root node, the interdiction problem (23)-(31) is solved by a MIP solver to identify the 
optimal set of interdictions when no protection takes place. Then a branching procedure is 
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started on the protection variables associated with the facilities in the optimal interdiction 
set, called the candidate set of branching variables (CS). When a protection variable zj is 
selected from the CS of the current tree node and fixed to one, a new tree node is 
generated and an interdiction problem is solved with an additional constraint which 
prevents the interdiction of facility j. The optimal solution to this problem generates the 
candidate set of variables to branch on associated with the new node. When a protection 
variable zj is selected from the CS and fixed to zero, a new tree node is generated which 
inherits the CS from its parent node but without the variable zj . If the CS of the new node 
is empty, the node is fathomed; otherwise a new variable is selected from it for branching. 
A leaf node is reached when exactly q protection variables are fixed to one along a path 
from the root node to the current node. The algorithm visits the tree nodes according to a 
depth-first strategy and at each node the variable to branch on is selected at random from 
the CS.    
 
A nice feature of this approach is that the size of the tree and, hence, the number of 
interdiction problems (23)-(31) which are solved during the execution, is not affected by 
the number of facilities in the initial configuration, p, but only by the parameters q and r 
(the reader is referred to Scaparra and Church, 2008 for a formal proof). Additionally, at 
termination, the algorithm identifies all optimal protection strategies, if more than one 
exists, thus providing a system planner with the flexibility of choosing the preferred 
alternative on the base of other managerial and planning criteria. 
6. Experimental Results 
We have conducted a set of computational experiments to assess the overall effectiveness 
of the CRIMF modelling approach and to provide some managerial insights on the 
potential impact of protection strategies on system efficiency improvements. Specifically, 
we have focused the analysis on 1) the tractability of the CRIMF model; 2) the impact of 
protective resources on overall cost reduction in case of disruption; and 3) the sensitivity 
of the protection strategies to the number of potential losses.    
6.1 Data Sets and Experimental Setup 
The computational experiments were conducted on a benchmark data set, frequently used 
in location analysis: the London, Ontario data set (Goodchild and Noronha 1983). This 
data set contains 150 demand nodes, and distances are based upon a road network. Using 
this data set, we have solved problem instances for different combinations of the 
parameters p, q and r. Namely, we considered values of p in {20, 25, 30}, q in {1, 2, 3, 4, 
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5} and r in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. In our testing, we assumed that the p facilities in the initial 
configuration are located at the optimal sites identified by solving a capacitated p-median 
problem. As the London data set does not contain information about facility capacities, 
for each value of p, we set the capacity of the facilities equal to  .  This choice is 
equivalent to assuming that the capacity utilization of the system under normal condition 
is about 90% or, in other words, that the system has a 10% built-in idle capacity. Finally, 
we assumed that the lost sale cost incurred if a customer cannot receive service after a 
disruption is larger than the cost of serving any customer from any facility in the system. 
More specifically, for each customer i, we set  . 
 
The experiments were run on a PC equipped with an Intel Core 2 CPU @ 2.4 GHz, 3GB 
of RAM and Windows XP Professional operating system. The implicit enumeration 
algorithm described in Section 5 was implemented in C++ and compiled using Microsoft 
Visual C++ .NET 2003. The interdiction problems (23)-(31) at each node of the 
enumeration tree were solved using the MIP solver Cplex 11. 
6.2 Computational Analysis 
The results of our computational investigation are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1 displays the objective function value of the optimal protection strategies for 
various combinations of the parameters. Reading the table by row, we can observe for 
each system size, p, and protection resource level, q, the impact of additional losses on 
the system operational cost. Conversely, each column highlights the impact on the 
objective of increasing the protection resources. A more in-depth analysis of the latter 
issue is provided in the following section.  
 
For the same combinations of parameters, Table 2 shows the computing time in seconds. 
The solution times suggest that we can solve to optimality CRIMF instances of realistic 
size with relative ease, if the number of possible losses is small. As expected, the 
computing effort increases appreciably for larger values of r, larger systems and higher 
levels of protection resources.  Whereas all the instances with r < 2 were solved in a 
matter of seconds, larger values of this parameter led to much higher running times. The 
most difficult instance (p = 30, q = 5, r = 5) required more than a day to be solved to 
optimality. However, given that this kind of protection models is strategic in nature, 
computing times in this order of magnitude are not overly critical and do no represent an 
impediment to the actual implementation of the optimal protection strategies. Overall, we 
can conclude that the CRIMF model is tractable for all the selected combinations of 
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parameters. Also, we believe that these ranges of parameter values are the most 
interesting from a practical point of view. A coordinated attack on or the simultaneous 
loss of a much larger number of facilities than the ones considered here seems unrealistic 
or, at least, very unlikely to occur. Also, the effects of interdiction and fortification are 
much less critical in systems with a very large number of facilities, due to greater levels 
of redundancies present in such systems. Thus the case handled here with systems of 
around 30 facilities and possible losses of 4-5 facilities seems quite realistic. On the other 
side, fortification resources could vary considerably. We have reported results for 
protection strategies involving the fortification of up to 5 facilities, but our modelling 
approach can handle larger values as well, especially if the number of interdictions, which 
is the real critical element of the approach, is small. 
 
Table 1. Objective values for the London, Ont. data set and different values of p, q and r 
p r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
q = 1 146,091.49 181,437.34 374,022.61 587,408.95 803,568.21
q = 2 143,269.58 178,895.82 373,906.37 584,615.28 798,523.83
q = 3 140,640.15 171,150.05 370,833.41 582,509.06 795,972.70
q = 4 140,409.57 170,172.52 369,481.99 580,218.68 792,425.57
q = 5 140,406.91 170,107.07 368,105.01 579,142.22 789,787.80
q = 1 127,892.53 153,265.74 228,495.65 393,654.45 564,483.89
q = 2 124,960.03 150,999.82 225,191.95 390,720.46 562,591.84
q = 3 124,169.93 148,909.87 222,876.47 389,744.09 561,136.40
q = 4 123,362.77 144,310.84 220,408.47 388,750.33 558,391.70
q = 5 121,180.59 142,107.89 218,074.57 386,808.49 557,579.34
q = 1 110,621.32 125,830.69 147,235.51 251,914.07 395,240.27
q = 2 106,093.07 119,684.24 145,398.43 250,496.84 393,437.48
q = 3 104,969.78 118,077.38 140,471.42 248,534.05 390,634.70
q = 4 104,853.24 117,964.80 138,018.79 246,463.88 387,888.26

















Table 2. Running times (sec.) for the London, Ont. data set and different values of p, q and r 
p r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
q = 1 1.23 7.89 29.02 32.78 27.28
q = 2 1.97 16.56 83.10 78.58 77.56
q = 3 2.80 29.36 255.84 173.64 251.94
q = 4 3.44 46.30 536.99 403.03 555.38
q = 5 4.06 65.64 935.79 732.54 1,131.21
q = 1 1.89 23.38 179.13 283.32 283.95
q = 2 2.78 41.97 424.39 810.51 1,173.43
q = 3 3.67 73.41 796.16 1,626.42 3,645.48
q = 4 6.98 112.50 1,203.80 2,961.13 8,398.46
q = 5 7.86 154.42 1,993.71 5,523.97 17,155.18
q = 1 2.47 49.48 362.14 1,311.12 1,822.96
q = 2 4.13 123.63 900.10 3,772.30 7,273.92
q = 3 5.88 242.49 1,802.05 9,083.70 23,750.22
q = 4 6.91 394.93 3,270.84 21,240.75 58,955.12






6.3 Marginal Efficiency Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to present a practical analysis framework to help system 
analysts and policy makers identify efficient employments of protective resources, using 
the results of the CRIMF model. Specifically, we analyze the impact that additional 
protection investments may have on the overall system efficiency (or cost reduction) in 
case of disruptions of different magnitude. We illustrate the analysis using the London, 
Ontario data set with 20, 25 and 30 operating facilities. The results of the analysis are 
displayed in Fig. 1. The column graph shows the percentage marginal efficiency 
improvement, in terms of reduced service and lost sale costs, derived from any individual 
protection. It can be noted that the marginal efficiency gains are not monotonically 
decreasing in the number of fortifications. Each column presents the marginal 
improvement in system efficiency associated with each added level of fortification. As an 
example, in a system with 20 facilities (p = 20) and 2 possible losses (r = 2), the optimal 
protection of a single facility (q = 1) results in an efficiency increase of slightly more than 
2.5% (the lowest segment of the second column in the graph). The protection of the 
second facility contributes an additional 1.5% improvement (resulting in a total 
improvement of 4% for the first two facilities protected). However, the greatest 
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percentage marginal benefit is obtained when the third facility is protected. This yields a 
further 4% improvement with an overall efficiency gain of more than 8%.  
The graph in Fig. 1 also highlights possible resource wastage. For instance, when p = 20 
and r = 3 (third column), there is almost no added value in protecting two facilities rather 
than one, whereas the protection of a third facility more than triples the return on 
investment compared to the second fortification. In such a situation, security investments 
are warranted only to protect one or three facilities, depending upon the resource 
availability, risk tolerance and minimum efficiency requirement. However, security 
investment for protecting two facilities should be avoided for this case. Finally, it is worth 
noticing that the percentage efficiency improvements are more noticeable when the 
system is still able to provide service to all the customers in spite of the disruption, 
whereas they are less pronounced when lost sale costs are incurred. As an example, the 
system with 20 facilities is still able to satisfy all customer demands if one or two 
facilities are lost due to disruption (columns 1 and 2 in the graph). However, if three or 
more facilities are disrupted, the remaining facilities cannot supply all the demand. The 
percentage efficiency improvement in these cases is somewhat less noticeable (columns 
3, 4 and 5). A similar behaviour can be noticed for the systems with 25 and 30 facilities.        
 












































6.4 Solutions Sensitivity to the Number of Potential Losses  
In this final section, we address the issue of estimating the parameter r and analyze the 
impacts of making a miscalculation/estimation of this parameter in terms of which 
optimal protection strategy is selected.  The choice of r is a critical one and fixing it to a 
specific value may seem subjective. The number of terrorist targets or potential losses due 
to catastrophic events, in fact, cannot be estimated on the base of historical data and is 
therefore difficult to predict accurately. To overcome this potential shortcoming of our 
modeling approach, we have solved the CRIMF model for different values of r. We then 
used the results obtained to infer core sets of key facilities to harden and, eventually, to 
identify the best protection strategy across the range of r values considered. An example 
of this analysis is depicted in Tables 3, 4 and 5 for the London, Ontario data set with 30 
facilities and assuming that resources are available to protect 5 facilities (q = 5). Table 3 
displays the optimal protections and interdiction responses identified by solving CRIMF 
with values of r ranging between 1 and 5. It can be seen that there are some critical 
facilities (e.g., facility 47) that are selected in every protection plan, independently on the 
number of expected losses. On the other side of the spectrum, some facilities only appear 
in one protection or interdiction set (e.g. 111 and 117).     
 
To identify the overall best protection set, we consider the optimal protection plan 
computed for a giver r and evaluate the cost of that plan if a different number of losses 
occur in practice. The results are displayed in Table 4. The minimum cost in each column 
is achieved along the diagonal, since in this case the assumed number of losses is the one 
occurring in reality. For all the other cases, it is possible to compute the extent to which 
the cost may increase if the r is misestimated. The absolute cost increase for each pair of 
assumed-actual number of losses is displayed in Table 5. The maximum and average cost 
increase for each assumed value of r are also displayed in the last two columns. This 
analysis suggests that the best protection strategy for this problem instance is the one 
obtained with r = 2 as it results in the minimum maximum and average absolute increases 
in cost. Note that the protection plans identified with high values of r (e.g. r = 4 or r = 5) 
can perform quite poorly if the extent of the disruption is smaller. In this case, in fact, 
cost increases of about 7% can be observed as compared to the optimal protection plans 
(e.g. if the actual r is 2 or 3).   
 
Although stochastic models which explicitly take into account expected numbers of 
losses have been developed for the uncapacitated RIMF (Liberatore et al. 2008, 
Liberatore and Scaparra 2009), these models cannot be easily adjusted to deal with 
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capacity restrictions. In the absence of more advanced stochastic models, the type of 
analysis illustrated above may represent a viable alternative for the identification of sound 
protection strategies against disruptions of unknown magnitude.   
 
Table 3. Optimal protections and interdictions for the London, Ont. data set with p=30 and q = 5. 
r
1 47 56 66 119 149 141
2 47 56 84 141 149 66 108
3 8 47 119 141 149 56 66 84
4 47 66 84 117 141 56 70 108 111
5 47 56 66 70 84 39 103 141 144 149
Optimal Protection Set Optimal Interdiction Set
 
 
Table 4. Cross-comparison of r-optimized CRIMF solutions across different number of facility 
losses. Objective function values.  
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
r = 1 104,637.45 119,684.24 145,398.43 250,705.21 391,321.88
r = 2 104,969.78 117,442.56 140,471.42 247,382.91 391,133.97
r = 3 106,093.07 118,077.38 137,346.00 250,496.84 395,240.27
r = 4 110,621.32 125,830.69 146,662.16 246,410.57 390,634.70




Actual number of losses
 
 
Table 5. Cross-comparison of r-optimized CRIMF solutions across different number of facility 
losses. Absolute increase in costs. 
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 Max Avg
r = 1 0.00 2,241.68 8,052.43 4,294.64 3,523.70 8,052.43 3,622.49
r = 2 332.33 0.00 3,125.42 972.34 3,335.79 3,335.79 1,553.18
r = 3 1,455.62 634.82 0.00 4,086.27 7,442.09 7,442.09 2,723.76
r = 4 5,983.87 8,388.13 9,316.16 0.00 2,836.52 9,316.16 5,304.94









7. Summary and Conclusions 
Policies to mitigate possible emergency events such as natural and man-made disasters 
are facing increasing scrutiny. Mitigation strategies include among others the protection 
or hardening of physical infrastructure components so as to make service and supply 
systems more resilient to external disruptions and circumscribe the harmful ripple effects 
of disruptive events. In this paper, we have proposed a new modeling approach to identify 
sound protection strategies for capacitated facility systems, so that limited protection 
resources are utilized in the most trenchant way possible. The introduction of capacity 
constraints within a protection-interdiction model greatly increases the complexity of the 
problem and requires the formulation of a three-level program. We showed how this 
multi-level program can be reduced to a bi-level model by dualization of the inner level 
user problem. This bi-level model can be solved by the implicit enumeration algorithm 
proposed in Scaparra and Church 2008b for the uncapacitated problem.  We have also 
presented an application of this model and suggested how model results could be used in 
advanced planning.    
In terms of future work, we envision several possible extensions and variations of the 
proposed protection model. These may include: stochastic components, multi-period 
planning models, multi-tier supply systems and inventory management issues. Analogous 
models which optimize protection strategies against expected losses rather than worst-
case losses will also be investigated.   
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